The regulation of vertical relationships between rms is the subject of persistent legal and academic controversy. The literature studying vertical trade relationships seems to assume that an upstream monopolist prefers downstream competition over exclusive distribution arrangements.
Introduction
The regulation of vertical relationships between rms is a highly controversial issue for international economists and antitrust authorities (GANSLANDT AND MASKUS, 2007; MASKUS AND CHEN, 2004; RICHARDSON, 2004) . At the heart of this debate is the ambiguous nature of the effects of exclusive distribution arrangements on upstream producers, downstream traders, and consumers. For instance, Apple's shift from exclusive arrangements with national carriers for the initial distribution of the iPhone (e.g., AT&T in the United States and T-Mobile in Germany) to competing distribution systems in 2010 has recently attracted widespread attention (DE FONTENAY ET AL., 2010; EHRLICH . 2 In addition, car manufacturers often maintain exclusive distribution channels in each country in order to vertically control the operations of their local distributors (LUTZ, 2004) .
One puzzle in the literature on vertically organized markets is the challenge to explain the widespread use of exclusive contracts in downstream markets despite the obvious disadvantages of double marginalization. For an upstream monopolist, exclusive contracts are favorable if the monopoly rents of the downstream monopolist can be extracted, e.g., by auctioning off the rights to exclusive dealings. Vertical restraints, however, such as non-linear (two-part) tariffs, resale price maintenance, or tie-in provisions are often illegal because they either restrict competition or constitute an abuse of dominant position, e.g., according to Sections 1 and 2 of the U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act or Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, respectively. If the complete extraction of monopoly rents is impossible, perfect downstream competition appears to be the best alternative because downstream sellers would charge prices at the marginal costs determined by the upstream monopolist's prices.
Most of the literature regarding vertical market integration seems to (implicitly) assume that an upstream monopolist prefers downstream competition over exclusive distribution under linear pricing (DURHAM, 2000; POLASKY, 1992; REY AND STIGLITZ, 1995 
A simple model
There is a single Producer P of a product x with a linear cost function c(x) = c x. Demand for the product is given by P (x) = a bx. The producer cannot access the market directly but sells the product through either To provide a real-world example, let the producer be an upstream gasoline re ner that in uences the retail prices of vertically integrated gasoline stations through station-speci c wholesale prices (HASTINGS AND GILBERT, 2005) . Traders (gasoline stations) j 2 J may differ in their constant marginal cost of delivery k j . Without loss of generality, the traders are ranked by:
::: k n : As the producer's supply prices cannot be lower than the marginal cost of production c; a trader with local costs k j a c would not supply.
Assumption 2.1 (a) increasing local costs: k 1 k 2 :::k j k j+1 ::: k n ;
(b) potential traders: a c k n > 0:
Assumption 2.1 implies that all traders provide some potential for the producer to earn pro ts.
Exclusive distribution: double marginalization
Trader B has a viable downstream monopoly, a > c + k B . Given the price charged by the producer q, Trader B chooses x to maximize B = P (x) x (q + k B ) x. We obtain F x B (q) := max 0;
The producer sets q to maximize = (q c) x B (q); yielding the optimal strategy
Summarizing, if the downstream monopoly is viable, a > c + k B , then q M > c and we obtain F supply price:
F producer's pro t:
F consumer surplus:
F aggregate pro t:
F welfare:
(a c k B ) 2 :
Downstream Cournot competition
Before turning to the case of an arbitrary number of potential traders, consider the duopoly case.
The two-trader case
Consider two potential traders, B and C, with k B k C . For instance, downstream traders may differ in per unit costs, due to different levels of customer service (SPIEGEL AND YEHEZKEL, 2003) .
3 Figure 1 illustrates this situation.
Each trader j 2 fB; Cg chooses x j to maximize
o . The Nash equilibrium quantities Figure 1 . Traders and market
x B (q B ; q C ) and x C (q B ; q C ) which depend on the supply price policy of the producer are
Notice that the producer's supply price policy could be such that only one trader serves the market. Hence, exclusive trading can be induced by the producer via price differentiation between the traders. Figure 2 illustrates two cases. The producer sets prices (q B ; q C ) to maximize pro t
Figure 2. Types of downstream Nash equilibria
The Nash equilibrium quantities x B (q B ; q C ) and x C (q B ; q C ) are neither concave nor convex functions. This property complicates the solution of the producer's problem considerably. The Nash equilibrium quantities are, however, piecewise linear functions of (q B ; q C ). Moreover, for any j = B; C, one can easily con rm that x j (q B ; q C ) = x j (q j ) if and only if x j (q B ; q C ) = 0. Indeed, this nding is obvious from Figure 2 . Hence, one can divide the set of supply prices (q B ; q C ) into four regions, which are depicted in Figure 3 :
and x C (q B ; q C ) = 0: Figure 3 shows the iso-pro t lines for the pro t function of the producer (Equation 1). holds exclusive rights. 4 The optimal solution for case (i) can be derived from
Straightforward computations yield the solution, which is summarized in Lemma 4.1:
4 In Region (iv), no trader supplies the commodity. (a c + k B 2k C )g; F aggregate supply:
Proofs are provided in the appendix. However, straightforward proofs are omitted. Comparing the pro ts obtained from exclusive contracts reveals that an exclusive contract with the low-cost
Trader B is more pro table for the producer than one with Trader C: The producer chooses a supply price policy that F either makes it unpro table for the high-cost trader to participate in the downstream market (an exclusive contract with B), F or that has both players supply the commodity (non-exclusive trade).
In Figure 3 , the producer chooses supply prices in Regions (i) or (ii) but never in Region (iii).
The following proposition characterizes these cases.
Proposition 4.2 Non-exclusive trade condition An equilibrium with non-exclusive downstream trade is optimal for the producer if
Proposition 4.2 shows that the producer chooses non-excluding supply prices if the costs of the high-cost Trader C do not exceed the costs of Trader B by an excessive amount. For k C > k B , the producer subsidizes C to keep him in the market,
Condition (2) can be viewed as an upper limit for this type of subsidization. The following proposition summarizes the welfare implications of non-exclusive trade.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose there is an equilibrium where the optimal supply price policy is such that both traders supply the commodity. One obtains the following welfare level: F aggregate pro t:
Welfare conditions are harder to interpret because there is a trade-off between more ef cient downstream trade and inef cient cost effects.
Proposition 4.4 Welfare e¤ects of non-exclusive trade

Non-exclusive trade will (i) increase consumer surplus if
The conditions on the exogenous parameters (a; c; k B ; k C ) that are listed in Proposition 4.4 are necessary and suf cient conditions for welfare gains from non-exclusive trade. Most of these conditions are not intuitive because they re ect the trade-off between gains in consumer surplus and the production inef ciencies resulting from the inclusion of traders with higher costs. By Proposition 4.2, gains in consumer surplus are achieved whenever there are non-exclusive trade contracts. This is only the case if the high trading costs do not exceed the low costs by too much, e.g., k B = k C . The greatest gain in consumer surplus is realized if k B = k C = 0.
Aggregate pro ts increase for k B = k C ; which is obvious from Proposition 4.4 (ii). Hence, we can conclude that non-exclusive trade is unambiguously welfare-enhancing if the local costs of the traders are equal. Indeed, by continuity of the conditions in Proposition 4.4, this result remains true for local costs that do not differ by too much.
The n-trader case
Consider a set of n potential downstream traders who differ in k j : Denoting X = P k2J x k as the aggregate downstream supply and X j := P j6 =k2J
x k as the aggregate supply of the competing traders other than j; one can write the pro t of Trader j as j = P (X j +x j ) x j (q j + k j ) x j .
Straightforward optimization with respect to the quantity x j yields r j (X j ) = max n 0;
Lemma 4.5 Given an array of prices q = (q 1 ; :::; q n ) charged by the producer, the Cournot equilibrium with n potential traders is F aggregate supply:
0;
;
The producer chooses prices (q j ) j2J to maximize
Proposition 4.6 shows the solution to this problem.
Proposition 4.6 For a set of n potential traders, we obtain in equilibrium:
F traders' supply prices:
F aggregate supply:
F traders' pro t:
The optimal supply prices are the same as under the respective monopolies. 5 The number of active traders in a Nash equilibrium depends on the supply price vector q = (q 1 ; :::; q n ): Suppose that there is a trader m n who does not offer the producer's product given the equilibrium supply prices. By Assumption 2.1(a), traders m + i for i = 1; ::; n m also do not trade the product. The following proposition gives the condition for traders to be active in the downstream market.
Proposition 4.7 There exists a trader m 2 I such that all traders j < m supply and all traders j m do not supply. Trader m is determined by
Proposition 4.7 is the analogue of Proposition 4.2 for the n-trader case. With differing trading costs, not all traders are necessarily active at the Nash equilibrium supply prices q C = (q C 1 ; :::; q C n ). However, given Assumption 2.1 (b), it is possible that all n traders are active,
It is also possible to provide suf cient conditions for the welfare effects of an increase in the number of active traders in the downstream market.
Consumer surplus is strictly increasing in the amount of the product traded downstream. By setting X C n+1 X C n , we derive suf cient conditions under which the aggregate quantity traded X C increases if the number of active traders increases:
From X C (Proposition 4.6), it is clear that this depends on whether the demand effect (a c)
of an additional trader outweighs the additional costs k n+1 introduced by this trader. A more clear-cut result is possible for symmetric local costs.
Symmetric local costs
Let k j = k for all j 2 J: By Proposition 4.7, it is optimal for the producer to have all n traders active. In this special case, we can consider the limit if the number of traders increases.
Proposition 4.8 Assume k j = k for all j = 1; 2; :::; n: As n ! 1; we obtain in equilibrium: F traders' supply prices:
(a c k) ;
An individual trader's supply vanishes in the limit, traders' pro t is driven to zero, and the producer extracts the full monopoly rent. This result appears to be the scenario that most of authors who were cited in the introduction have in mind. In the symmetric case, each additional trader increases the aggregate downstream supply and social surplus. The limiting maximal aggregate supply corresponds to the case in which the producer acts as a direct downstream monopoly.
This maximal supply de nes the upper limit of social surplus. In conclusion, for symmetric local costs, each additional trader reduces the double marginalization problem unambiguously and leads to a higher pro t for the monopolist and a higher consumer surplus.
Conclusion
We study Cournot quantity setting competition among traders of a homogeneous product in In addition, we investigate the welfare effects of non-exclusive trade. We nd that the upstream monopolist differentiates supply prices to keep as many traders as feasible in the downstream market. This may, however, reduce consumer surplus compared to exclusive downstream trade. 
